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LISTING OF ALL PARTIES TO THE 
PROCEEDINGS IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS 
LEWIS DUNCAN, individually and as personal representative of the 
Estate of Patrick Duncan, deceased 
JASON P. DUNCAN, a minor by and through his Guardian ad Litem 
ALICE DUNCAN 
NOREEN DUNCAN 
MICHAEL DUNCAN 
TIM DUNCAN 
KEVIN DUNCAN 
BRIEN DUNCAN 
MICHELLE BOWERS, individually and as personal representative of 
the Estate of Jeffrey Bowers, deceased 
JUDSON BOWERS 
FLORENCE HANSON 
SHELLY BOWERS 
SHERRY BOWERS 
MONICA HENWOOD, individually and as personal representative of 
the estate of Ramon Henwood, deceased 
PHYLLIS HENWOOD 
OWEN HENWOOD 
DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL KLEINMAN 
DOES 1 through 100, inclusive 
Plaintiffs/Appellants respectfully submit their Reply 
Brief in these proceedings. 
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS1 STATEMENTS OF FACT 
Appellants take exception to the following "corrections 
and additions" to Plaintiffs1 Statement of Facts by either Union 
Pacific or the State of Utah as the same are irrelevant, 
inaccurate and/or unsupported by the record on appeal. 
1. At paragraphs 5 and 6 of its Brief, Union Pacific 
discusses the alleged high volume level of Patrick Duncan's car 
stereo and the purported absence of evidence that he made any 
effort to brake the automobile. At best, the statements relate 
to Defendants1 contributory negligence claims or rebut a showing 
of proximate cause as part of Plaintiffs1 prima facie case. They 
are not, however, the least bit relevant to this Court's 
consideration of the issues pending, to wit: whether the Railroad 
has duties with respect to warning devices at crossings; whether 
the State has sovereign immunity for decisions on such devices, 
and; was there sufficient evidence to show a disputed issue of 
material fact on whether the Droubay Road crossing was "extra-
hazardous" precluding summary judgment in Defendants1 favor. 
2. At paragraph 2 of its description of the course of 
proceedings below, Union Pacific again attempts to inject into 
this appeal the highly irrelevant, prejudicial and disputed issue 
of Patrick Duncan's alleged substance abuse. Judge Hansen 
correctly ignored it in granting the Motions for Summary Judgment 
yet Respondents continue to raise this inflammatory evidence. 
Respondents1 statements on the substance abuse issue are 
objectionable and irrelevant to the substantive issues pending 
before the Court and should be stricken. See, Rule 24(k), Rules 
of Utah Appellate Procedure. 
3. Paragraph 2 of Union Pacificfs Brief discussing the 
Droubay Road crossing and Plaintiff's alleged ability to "view 
the train's approach in their peripheral vision with little or no 
need to turn their heads" is not only speculative but wholly 
without support in the record. This much seems obvious by the 
absence of any citation to the record. 
4. Respondents1 statements that the railroad crossing 
advance warnings signs, located 305 feet South of the crossing, 
where in accordance with the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control 
Devices ("MUTCD") is inaccurate and disputed by the parties. As 
revealed by the Manual portion excerpted at Union Pacific's 
Appendix, and as noted in the Crommelin Affidavit, the 
recommended distance for a 55 m.p.h. highway is 700 feet. 300 
feet is the absolute minimum distance for this road thus 
substantiating Plaintiffs' claims that warning sign placement is 
evidence that the Droubay Road crossing was extra-hazardous and 
Defendants breached duties owed to warn of those hazards. 
5. Respondents wrongly dispute the similarity of other 
accidents which occurred at the Droubay Road crossing. As 
discussed in greater detail below, the standards of similarity 
applied by the courts are extremely broad, easily encompassing 
the accidents relied on by Plaintiffs. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT RAILROAD HAS ONGOING OBLIGATIONS TO PROTECT THE 
TRAVELING PUBLIC AT DANGEROUS CROSSINGS. 
A. UNION PACIFIC HAS WAIVED ANY DEFENSE PREMISED UPON STATE OR 
FEDERAL STATUTORY PREEMPTION. 
Both the District Court and Court of Appeals rulings1 
in favor of the Union Pacific focused on the absence of any duty 
to improve warning devices at rail crossings. Duties imposed by 
long-standing Utah precedent requiring a railroad to take 
additional precautions at extra-hazardous crossings were 
"preempted" by the statutory scheme set forth at Utah Code Ann. § 
54-4-14 et seq. which grants the Utah Department of 
Transportation authority to prescribe the manner of warning 
devices to be utilized at railroad crossings. In its Brief, 
Union Pacific has supplemented earlier preemption arguments by 
asserting federal preemption under the Federal Rail Safety Act of 
1970 ("FRSA"), 45 U.S.C. § 421, et seq. As the Railroad did not 
plead state or federal preemption as an affirmative defense in 
its original answer, this Court should find it barred under Rule 
8(c), U.R.C.P. 
Only two affirmative defenses were stated by Union 
Pacific; a contributory negligence defense and a defense 
attempting to shift the accident's blame to Patrick Duncan. 
Nowhere is there a mention of the railroad's traditional duties 
Duncan v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 790 P.2d 595 (Utah 
App. 1990). 
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to warn the public of hazardous crossings being preempted by 
either state or federal statutes which delegate authority over 
warning devices to state governmental agencies such as UDOT. 
Although Appellants could not find a Utah case 
addressing the question of whether "preemption11 is an affirmative 
defense which must be pled by Defendant or else waived, cases 
under the identically worded Federal Rule of Civil Procedure are 
consistent in finding that preemption of common law duties comes 
within the preclusion of Rule 8(c). 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 1271 (1990). See also. In re Air Crash 
-Disaster at Stapleton International Airport, Denver, Colorado, on 
November 15, 1987, 721 F. Supp. 1185 (D. Colo. 1988) wherein, 
under similar circumstances, the court held that preemption of 
common law claims based on federal regulatory statutes (there the 
Federal Aviation Act and regulations promulgated thereunder) must 
be set forth as an affirmative defense or else is waived. 
The argument that Union Pacific has waived a preemption 
defense is particularly forceful with respect to its sudden and 
unexpected reliance on federal law, in particular the FRSA. 
Despite the existence of the Act prior to the fatal Duncan 
accident, at this final stage of these proceedings Union Pacific 
asks the Court to indulge its oversight and consider a complex 
new defense. This tardy attempt to inject new issues into the 
case is not only prejudicial to Appellants but contrary to 
elementary rules of appellate practice. 
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B. NEITHER STATE NOR FEDERAL LAWS REGARDING WARNING DEVICES AT 
CROSSINGS ABROGATE THE RAILROAD'S TRADITIONAL DUTIES TO TAKE 
ACTION IF ON NOTICE OF DANGEROUS CONDITIONS. 
1. State Statutes. 
There is little question that Union Pacific could not 
entirely of its own accord place automatic crossing gates or 
otherwise enhance warning devices at the Droubay Road crossing. 
This would be violative of Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-14. But while 
acknowledging that the primary authority to designate crossing 
warning devices resides with UDOT, the question posed by this 
appeal is whether the absence of authority absolves Defendant 
from taking other actions designed to better protect the public 
at railroad crossings. As found in the well-reasoned cases 
discussed at pp. 17 through 21 of Appellants1 opening Brief, it 
does not. 
Contrary to Union Pacific's arguments, railroads are 
frequently in a unique position to assess whether any given 
crossing is hazardous. As our facts indicate, it may have been 
contacted by local government officials requesting enhanced 
signage. Railroad representatives may also be members of 
surveillance teams assigned to investigate crossings. Union 
Pacific's self-deprecating statements that it lacks the expertise 
to determine appropriate traffic control devices at crossings is 
without support in the record and flies in the face of historical 
experience. 
As such, courts have imposed on railroads the 
obligation to petition or urge appropriate state authorities to 
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upgrade crossing warning devices when on notice of hazardous 
conditions. See, McMinn v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 716 F. Supp. 
125 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) and Petrove v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad 
Co., 436 N.W.2d 733 (Mich. App. 1989). Authority cited by Union 
Pacific stops short of relieving a railroad of its duty to 
petition the governing state agency to allow additional warning 
devices or take other actions designed to eliminate hazards. 
Even those cases cited by Union Pacific in support of 
the proposition that state law has abrogated a railroads1 duties 
with respect to crossing safety offer little support for this 
contention. For instance, in Eddington v. Grand Trunk Western 
Railroad Co., 418 N.W.2d 415 (Mich. App. 1987), the railroadfs 
duties were not even addressed. Instead, the court was concerned 
with a county's obligations as to hazardous crossings. Nor was 
the adequacy of crossing devices challenged as an issue on appeal 
in South v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 290 N.W.2d 819 
(N.D. 1980) as Respondent alleges. Harrison v. Grand Trunk 
Western Railroad Co., 413 N.W.2d 429 (Mich. App. 1987), another 
Michigan case relied on by Respondent actually supports 
Appellants f argument. 
In other words, Defendants cannot erect 
additional crossing signs without proper 
permission. . . however, apart from the above 
provisions, Defendants still have common law 
duty of due care. [citation omitted] That duty 
include petitioning the proper authorities when 
the railroad or the county considers warning 
devices at a dangerous crossing to be 
insufficient, so that the situation can be 
remedied. 
6 
Id. at 431. 
Union Pacificfs attempts to explain away the 
inconsistency in its state preemption argument raised by the 
statutory liability imposed on railroads by Utah Code Ann. § 56-
1-11 are equally unpersuasive. Defendant continually asserts 
that duties under this provision extend only to maintenance of 
crossings while the statute itself imposes liability for damages 
caused by neglect to "make and maintain good and sufficient 
crossings", (emphasis added). Furthermore, courts construing the 
term "maintenance" in the context of similarly worded statutes 
have found that it exceeds mere physical care and upkeep to 
include questions of traffic control devices. See, Miller v. New 
Mexico Department of Transportation, 741 P.2d 1374 (N.M. 1987). 
Indeed, the only means of giving effect to the clearly worded 
mandate of § 56-1-11 here is to hold Union Pacific accountable 
for Plaintiffs1 damages regardless of UDOT's ultimate authority 
to approve crossing warning devices. 
2. Federal Statutes. 
Relying on various provisions of the FRSA, Union 
Pacific next argues its common law duty to maintain a safe 
crossing is preempted by federal law. Assuming, for purposes of 
argument, that Union Pacific has not waived a preemption defense 
by failing to plead or previously assert the same, it should 
still be rejected by this court. 
A proper analysis of any federal preemption defense 
begins with the presumption that state law is only superceded by 
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statutes or regulations where Congress specifically intended. 
This presumption is applied with particular consequence where 
issues of state tort liability are involved. See, Silkwood v. 
Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984). See also, Rosdail v. 
Western Aviation, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 681 (D. Colo. 1969) (state 
remedies for personal injury claims not preempted by pervasive 
federal regulation of air carriers). Absent a direct conflict or 
clear expression of Congressional intent to do away with tort 
liability, neither of which are present here, a finding of 
preemption is unwarranted. 
FRSA's stated purpose of establishing uniformity among 
railroad regulations, including those relevant to crossing 
warning devices is not contrary to Union Pacific's duty to take 
some action if on notice of hazardous conditions. The railroad 
can still notify state authorities that an upgrade in warning 
devices may be required or ask permission to install upgrades. 
And the railroad's involvement in the process of observing and 
determining which crossings are in need of additional protection 
suggests an ongoing responsibility and duty to the traveling 
public consistent with imposing liability on circumstances such 
as ours. It is thus no surprise that while acknowledging FRSA to 
be an effort by the federal government to improve grade crossing 
safety, courts have held "it does not lessen the statutory or 
common law duty of a railroad to maintain a good and safe 
crossing". Karl v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 880 F.2d 
68, 76 (8th Cir. 1989), citing Runkle v. Burlington Northern 
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Railroad Co., 613 P.2d 982, (Mont. 1980). There is simply no 
conflict between the duties urged by Appellants and federal 
regulation which would trigger preemption. 
With minor exceptions, cases cited by Union Pacific in 
support of their federal preemption defense are distinguishable 
and in apposite. In Sisk v. The National Railroad Passenger 
Corp., 647 F. Supp. 861 (D. Kan. 1986) the court was concerned 
with preemption of local ordinances on train speed not warning 
devices at crossings or common law tort liability. Nor is 
precedent on federal preemption as consistent and uniform in 
support of its position as Respondent would lead the court to 
believe. See, Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Mackey, 760 
S.W.2d 59 (Ark. 1988) (FRSA does not preempt state regulations on 
clearing vegetation from railroad crossings); Phillips Petroleum 
v. Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, 390 N.E.2d 620, 622 
(111. App 1979) (although state environmental regulations dealing 
with railroads were preempted by FRSA, this did not extend to 
areas of common law redress and tort liability); and Henry v. 
District Court, 645 P.2d 1350 (Mont. 1982). 
In spite of Union Pacific's comments, Karl v. 
Burlington Northern Railroad Co., supra., is not only "on point" 
but also the most recent federal circuit court expression on 
whether the FRSA preempts a common law negligence claim arising 
out of inadequate warning devices at a rail crossing. The 
opinion is well reasoned and consistent with the authority 
discussed above finding that even pervasive federal regulation 
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does not displace state tort law and duties thereunder. In view 
of the noted presumption, it is submitted that Marshall2 and 
other cases cited by Union Pacific and its analysis of Karl are 
an overly broad interpretation of the express terms of 45 U.S.C. 
§ 434.3 If the Ninth Circuit in Marshall had the opportunity to 
review the Supreme Court decision in Silkwood it would likely 
have reached a different conclusion. 
Although a federal statute or regulation will 
unquestionably preempt a conflicting state rule on the identical 
subject, it is a far different thing to find that laws concerning 
railroad safety somehow deprive these Plaintiffs of a claim 
against Union Pacific for its failure to take some action to warn 
the public of a hazardous rail crossing. Even if the Union 
Pacific has not waived a preemption defense, there is no basis to 
depart from longstanding precedent and statutory authority which 
stand for the unequivocal proposition that railroads owe 
Plaintiffs1 decedents a standard of due care to take actions at 
hazardous crossings. 
Marshall v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 720 F.2d 1149 (9th 
Cir. 1983). 
3
 Marshall is of dubious authority for Union Pacific's 
preemption claims. The 9th Circuit specifically held the 
railroad did have a duty install adequate warning devices at the 
subject crossing. Comments as to a railroad's duties under other 
circumstances (to wit: when local agencies had made a 
determination on the adequacy of existing devices) are dictum. 
720 F.2d 1154. 
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POINT II 
THE STATE IS NOT IMMUNE FROM LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENTLY 
CAUSED INJURIES AT RAILROAD CROSSINGS. 
A. DECISIONS AS TO CROSSING UPGRADES DO NOT CONSTITUTE THE 
EXERCISE OF A "DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION". 
As the State apparently admits, the facts of our case 
fall within the specific governmental immunity waiver established 
by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 which permits suits to recover for 
any injury caused by an unsafe or dangerous condition of any 
highway or structure located thereon. In an attempt to avoid the 
statute's explicit terms Respondent argues that the decisions 
-here at issue represent the exercise of a discretionary function 
for which immunity is granted under § 63-30-10(1)(a). 
In stating "there is no case which expressly holds that 
§ 63-30-8 stands on its own and is not qualified by § 63-30-
10(1)(a)" the State makes a grave and misleading representation 
as to the state of Utah law. In Bigelow v. Inqersol, 618 P.2d 
50, 54 (Utah 1980), the Supreme Court found "since the waiver of 
immunity in §§ 8 and 9 encompasses a much broader field of tort 
liability than merely negligent conduct of employees within the 
scope of their employment, the legislature could not have 
intended that § 10, including its exceptions, should modify §§8 
and 9 . . ." (emphasis added). (Quoting Sanford v. University of 
Utah, 488 P.2d 741, 745 (Utah 1971)). Any conceivable doubts 
flowing from the rulings in Bigelow or Richards4 are certainly 
4
 Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276 (Utah 1985). 
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clarified by the foregoing pronouncement. Although the Court 
need not proceed to analyze if the immunity waiver under § 63-30-
8 is subject to a "discretionary function" limitation, such an 
assessment would still not affect an outcome in Plaintiff's 
favor. This court has held on numerous prior occasions that 
decisions concerning the design of a traffic control system 
(which must be deemed to include warning devices at rail 
crossings) are not at the basic policy-making level and hence are 
not the exercise of a discretionary function. See, Andrus v. 
State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975); Carroll v. State Road 
Commission, 496 P.2d 888 (Utah 1972), and; Bigelow, supra. 
Instead, under the criteria established in Frank v. State, they 
represent decisions at an operational level.5 Furthermore, if 
there were any doubts whether this decision is "policy-making" as 
distinguished from "operational", summary judgment should have 
been denied and a trial ordered to resolve this critical fact. 
Rocky Mountain Thrift Store, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 7 84 
P.2d 459 (Utah 1989). 
The State's attempts to distinguish safety devices at 
railroad crossings and those at issue in Bigelow, Richards and 
Bowen6 are unavailing and simply point out the contradictions and 
confusion between the Court of Appeals decisions in Duncan and 
Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980). 
Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982). 
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Gleave and this Court's most recent opinions. Funding 
considerations which the Court of Appeals heavily relied upon in 
rendering the opinion in Duncan v. Union Pacific are present to 
the same degree in Biqelow, Richards and Bowen as in the railroad 
crossing cases. More important, since adoption of the MUTCD, all 
of these decisions are guided by uniform, set standards. As 
Defendants1 own Affidavits show, prioritization of crossings for 
enhancement of signal devices is made through application of a 
set mathematical formula. For this reason, the theoretical 
foundation of Velasquez8, which was the basis for the Gleave and 
Duncan rulings, is undermined. See, Ostendorf v. Kenyon, 347 
N.W.2d 834 (Minn. App. 1984) (where placement of warning signs is 
governed by MUTCD, state's duty to warn does not represent the 
exercise of a discretionary function). 
B. DECISIONS UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT ARE NOT 
SUPPORTIVE OF THE STATE OF UTAH'S IMMUNITY DEFENSE. 
Attempting to overcome the clear import of Richards, 
Biqelow and Bowen, the State directs this Court's attention to a 
number of cases construing the discretionary function immunity 
provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), specifically 
at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). Not only is the FTCA distinct from 
Utah's sovereign immunity scheme, but the cited cases involve 
decisions far different than placement of warning devices at a 
Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 749 
P.2d 660 (Utah App. 1988). 
8
 Velasquez v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 469 P.2d 5 (Utah 
1970). 
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railroad crossing. The analogy offers scant support for 
Respondent's governmental immunity defense. 
First, whereas the United States has generally waived 
immunity under § 2 674 of the Act, Utah has retained immunity 
subject to certain enumerated exceptions, two of which apply to 
our facts: § 63-30-8 for injuries resulting from a negligently 
designed traffic control system, and; § 63-30-10, a broader 
waiver encompassing injuries caused by the negligent act or 
omission of a State employee committed within the scope of his 
employment. The importance of § 8 of Utah Act is its clear 
expression of legislative intent to severely limit immunity for 
highway accidents. No such expression of congressional intent 
exists under the FTCA to guide the court's decision on what 
constitutes the exercise of a "discretionary function" when 
assessing the adequacy of warning devices. 
Nor is federal case law as clear-cut as Respondent 
suggests. Each case cited had to do with more generalized design 
decisions (e.g. Wright v. United States, 568 F.2d 153 (10th Cir. 
1977)) while in the specific area of warning devices, courts are 
less inclined to find their placement as being a protected 
discretionary level decision. This is particularly so where 
compliance with the MUTCD is at issue. 
In Morris v. United States, 585 F. Supp. 1543 (W.D. Mo. 
1984), the District Court found the government's decision 
regarding a closed road warning device to involve a routine 
operational level decision falling outside the discretionary 
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function exception to the FTCA, in part, relying upon application 
of the MUTCD. To the same effect is Driscoll v. United States, 
525 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1975) where the court rejected immunity 
for an alleged failure to install appropriate warning devices at 
an Air Force base, and; Smith v. United States, 546 F.2d 872 
(10th Cir. 1976) as to placement of warning signs in Yellowstone 
Park. As the decision in our case pertains to the type of device 
best suited to warn motorists at the Droubay Road crossing, it is 
far closer to the facts of Morris, Driscoll and Smith than the 
more generalized design evaluations present in the cases cited by 
Respondent. See also, Sevier v. United States, 832 F.2d 120 (9th 
Cir. 1987) (rejecting discretionary function immunity on claim 
that United States was negligent in failing to erect proper speed 
limit signs). 
Finally, to the extent FTCA cases support a 
discretionary function immunity argument, they are contrary to 
Utah authority and must, therefore, be little accorded little 
weight. 
There is no doubt that the design of traffic warning 
devices involves some degree of discretion. "It would be 
difficult to conceive of any official act, no matter how directly 
ministerial, that did not admit of some discretion in the matter 
of its performance . . . " W. PROSSER, A HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS, § 132 at 990 (4th ed. 1971). In assessing which end of 
the discretionary spectrum decisions as to traffic warning 
devices fall, the Utah Supreme Court has found they do not 
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represent basic plan-making level decisions immunized from suit, 
Richards v. Leavitt, supra. To the extent Respondent's cases 
under the FTCA are contrary to this finding, the only means of 
adopting their rationale is to drastically overrule well-
considered Utah precedent. Appellants urge the Supreme Court to 
continue its tradition of finding decisions on traffic warning 
devices to be at the operational level and not immune as the 
exercise of a discretionary function. 
POINT III 
THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING THAT THE DROUBAY 
ROAD CROSSING WAS flEXTRA-HAZARDOUS,f. 
The many factors which support a finding that the 
Droubay Road crossing was "extra-hazardous" requiring 
Defendants/Respondents to take additional precautions are 
discussed in Appellants1 opening Brief.9 Appellants also noted 
how the issue of whether a crossing is "extra-hazardous" is not 
properly the subject of summary proceedings, it typically being 
reserved for jury consideration. Nonetheless, a reply to 
Respondents1 contentions that the Droubay Road crossing was not 
"extra-hazardous" as a matter of law is necessary. 
In particular, Respondents challenge the Affidavit of 
Robert Crommelin which Appellants contend raised a genuine issue 
Among them are: high speed and high volume traffic on the 
roadway, including school buses; train volume and speed; a 
dangerous crossing angle; inadequate placement of existing 
warning signs, and; evidence of similar accidents at the 
crossing. See Appellants1 Brief at p. 32 and citations to the 
record thereat. 
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of material fact precluding entry of summary judgment in 
Defendants1 favor. Contrary to Respondents1 Briefs, there was 
ample foundation for Mr. Crommelm's opinion that the Droubay 
Road crossing was "extra-hazardous" necessitating a remand of 
this proceeding for a trial on the merits. 
1. Placement of the Advanced Warning Sign. 
Relying on the MUTCD, the State and Railroad argue the 
advance warning sign was placed at a adequate distance away from 
the crossing and hence is not evidence of its extra-hazardous 
nature. In fact, the Manual shows the minimum acceptable 
distance for placement on a comparable highway to be 450 feet 
which is still 50% more than the 305 feet present at Droubay Road 
and greatly less than the 700 feet advised under § 2C-3. 
Furthermore, even if Defendants had complied with the 
Manual, it establishes only a minimum standard for safety which 
the jury could still find inadequate under the circumstances of 
the particular crossing. Schaeffer v. Kansas Department of 
Transportation, 608 P.2d 1309 (Kan. 1980). 
2. Other Accidents at the Crossing. 
Defendants also contest Crommelin's reliance on other 
accidents at the crossing to support his conclusion. That other 
accidents can support a finding of "extra-hazardous" seems 
admitted by Respondents and the UDOT evaluation process as well. 
The number of accidents, both actual and anticipated, is a factor 
in the hazard rating index applied by surveillance teams in 
recommending enhancement ot existing warning devices. In the 
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case of Droubay Road, accidents at the crossing are precisely 
what prompted a change and resulted in prioritization for 
automatic crossing gates, (R. 298). 
Admittedly, before evidence of prior accidents is 
admissible, the plaintiff must show they occurred under 
reasonably similar, although not identical, circumstances. The 
standard is, however, very flexible and the better rule is to 
allow the jury to evaluate whether the minor variations in 
accidents effect an ultimate finding of extra-hazardous. Pyle v. 
Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 774 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. App. 
1989) . Here, Crommelin found the accidents to be reasonably 
similar and Judge Hanson should not have removed this issue from 
jury consideration by granting the summary judgment. 
3, Reliance on UDOT Surveillance Reports. 
Aside from conducting a personal inspection of the 
Droubay Road crossing, Robert Crommelin utilized allegedly 
inadmissible UDOT surveillance team reports in rendering his 
opinion. As previously asserted by Plaintiffs, even if the 
reports themselves are inadmissible, in accord with 2 3 U.S.C. § 
409, they may, nonetheless, be relied upon by an expert witness. 
See, Rule 703, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
More important, Respondents should be deemed to have 
waived any objection to this evidence as a consequence of their 
own submittal of surveillance reports through various Affidavits 
offered in support of their summary judgment motions. It is 
settled law that a party will waive any objection to the 
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admissibility of evidence if he later introduces the same in 
support of his claims. 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE, § 5039 (1977). See also, Bishop v. St. John Hospital, 
364 N.W.2d 290 (Mich. App. 1984) (incident report (cf. 
surveillance team report) which was inadmissible under state 
statute was nonetheless properly admitted where party challenging 
same relied on it). It would be highly prejudicial to permit the 
State and Union Pacific to submit Affidavits incorporating the 
surveillance team reports while denying Plaintiffs the 
opportunity of doing so through the Crommelin Affidavit. 
POINT IV 
PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTS HOLDING AT LEAST ONE OF THESE 
DEFENDANTS ACCOUNTABLE FOR HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS AT 
THE DROUBAY ROAD CROSSING. 
For different reasons, both the State and Railroad 
argue that sound public policy favors an absence of liability for 
damages proximately resulting from inadequate warning devices at 
hazardous railroad crossings. This is clearly the net effect of 
the Court of Appeals ruling in Duncan. But as it denies an 
injured party redress for negligently caused injuries and fosters 
the creation or continuance of dangerous conditions by removing 
the deterrent effect of tort liability, the Duncan opinion is 
unsound and must be overturned. 
A. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD. 
As a matter of policy, Union Pacific argues they cannot 
have a duty to warn the public of dangerous rail crossings 
without a corresponding right to install appropriate warning 
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devices. The fallacy here is an assumption that the only means 
of discharging the duty is to place automatic crossing gates at 
Droubay Road. It ignores the option of notifying those parties 
with authority to improve warning devices, petition a public 
agency for the right to improve crossing safety or, perhaps, 
going so far as to discontinue train service along the subject 
line or bring litigation to prompt change, all options which 
courts have found to be part of a railroad's common law duty of 
due care towards the traveling public. McMinn v. Consolidated 
Rail Corp., supra.; Petrove v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad Co., 
supra., and Wells v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 363 N.E.2d 
1001 (Ind. App. 1977). 
Farther, the Railroad is in a unique position to 
implement the important public policy of travelers' safety. It 
may have been notified of dangerous conditions by local 
authorities (as occurred here). Train crew members are also 
experienced in assessing crossing hazards despite Union Pacific's 
claimed lack of expertise. Finally, Defendants1 own evidence 
indicates how railroads participate in the actual decision-making 
process on prioritization of crossings for enhanced signage. All 
of these facts are indicative of Union Pacific's continued duties 
to take some action if on notice of a dangerous rail crossing. 
B. THE STATE OF UTAH. 
By its enactment of Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15, the 
Legislature implicitly assumed the duty to provide parties such 
as these Plaintiffs with safe railroad crossings, an obligation 
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previously imposed upon Union Pacific. In view of the 
substantial body of case law assessing tort liability on 
railroads for negligently caused injuries at hazardous crossings, 
the Legislature must also have considered judicial and fiscal 
consequences associated with this duty of due care. To find 
otherwise would grant the State immunity for negligently caused 
injuries and allow parties entrusted with the public well-being 
to act with impunity in determining what constitutes adequate 
crossing safeguards. Both factors weigh heavily in favor of 
rejecting a sovereign immunity defense on our facts. 
In order to avoid this anomalous result, the Court of 
Appeals in Duncan narrowed its ruling in favor of the State by 
granting immunity only to those decisions on "whether to improve 
the means of warning or control at the crossing" 790 P.2d 598. 
Because this neither compensates otherwise worthy injured parties 
nor deters negligent conduct or foster public safety, it should 
not withstand scrutiny by this court. 
Implications of the challenged Court of Appeals 
decision could be far reaching. Its scope easily encompasses not 
only the numerous railroad crossings in Utah but all highway or 
intersection warning devices as well. So long as UDOT provides 
minimal, warning and control, the State escapes liability. This 
is certainly not what the Supreme Court had in mind with its 
decisions in Bowen, Bigelow and Richards cited above. As a 
matter of public policy, the standard of "minimal effectiveness" 
as espoused in Duncan v. Union Pacific is bad law. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs/Appellants 
respectfully urge the Supreme Court to overturn the Court of 
Appeals opinion in Duncan v. Union Pacific Railroad, reverse 
Judge Hanson's grant of summary judgment in Defendants' favor and 
remand this case for a trial on the merits. 
Respectfully submitted this O —' day of February, 
1991, 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
MICHAEL A. KATZ k, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff^? 
Appellants 
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